Buffalo Law Review
Volume 9

Number 2

Article 4

1-1-1960

Marital Law in Transition: The Problem in Israel
Joseph Laufer
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview

Recommended Citation
Joseph Laufer, Marital Law in Transition: The Problem in Israel, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 321 (1960).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss2/4

This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

MARITAL LAW IN TRANSITION: THE PROBLEM IN ISRAEL
By JosEPH LAUFEP*
OR THE past two centuries the West has been struggling to refashion its

family law, in a hesitant response to the vastly changed and still changing
circumstances under which Western man has come to live. By way of a broad
generalization it may be said that, at the present time, jurisdiction over domestic relations has been largely shifted from ecclesiastical authority to the
temporal. The substantive law, still under the sway of religious ideas, is
gradually being recast in terms that reflect more nearly the emerging values of
an increasingly urban and homogeneous society. The process is painfully slow
for in few areas of the law are traditional attitudes more powerful or more
deeply embedded. In the wake of the world-wide sweep toward self-determination, industrialization and mass-literacy the same problem has now to be faced
everywhere. This is particularly true of the new nations in the Eastern half of
the world. Even at this formative stage of their development it is evident that
the recasting of their family laws, notably their marital rules, will be as
difficult and protracted an undertaking as it has been in the West. Israel, now
in her twelfth year and more Western than any of the recently established
states, may serve as an example.
I.
The legal system which Israel inherited from Great Britain, the Mandatory power, on May 15, 1948, the birthday of the new state, consisted
of two distinct components, one secular,'iThe other personal.' Secular or
"general. law was applicable to eeryone, within-Palestine's territory. It has
been aptly compared to a sequence of geological layers. At the bottom rests
Moslem law, restated in modem form and in the Turkish language in the
"Mejelleh", a compilation of private law promulgated for the Ottoman Empire
in the late sixties of the last century. This compilation is permeated by the
spirit of a primitive, agricultural society.' The second layer is formed by a
number of enactments of fairly modem character in the fields of commercial
law, devolution of estates and procedure, that reflect strong French influences.
They represent the final efforts to reform Ottoman law in the closing decades
of the Empire which collapsed in World War I. Superimposed on these strata
of Moslem and Ottoman law- was a heavy deposit of English law, imported into
Palestine through ordinances promulgated by the High Commissioner in virtue
of the powers granted him by an Order in Council of 1922.2 This Order in
* Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, School of Law. Former Director, HarvardBrandeis Cooperative Research on Israel's Legal Development.
1. See generally, Vitta, The Conflict of Laws in Matters of Personal Status in
Palestine (1947) [hereafter referred to as Vittal to which the writer owes much of the
material presented here.
2. 1 Legislation of Palestine, 1918-25 (Bentwich ed. 1926) 5 et seq. The pertinent
artcles of the Order in Council are reprinted in Vitta 270-273.
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Council embodied, as it were, the constitutional charter of the Mandate. The
ordinances, notably in the fields of public, commercial, criminal and adjective
law were usually suitable adaptations of English or colonial models. They were
the more formal emanations of an administration which displayed the characteristic features of British colonial government. Perhaps of even greater significance in our context was an express directive contained in Article 46 of the
1922 Order in Council to apply ". . . the substance of the common law, and the
doctrines of equity in force in England. . . ." whenever local law failed to
provide a rule of decision and local conditions did not make the application
inappropriate. 3 This directive opened a permanent "gateway" through which,
beyond formal enactments, the spirit of English law, along with its cases, spread
through the legal order of Palestine.
The second component of Palestine's law was not general but "personal".
It was determined, in the case of a Palestinian, by reference to any one of
eleven different bodies of religious law, depending on his religious affiliation,
and in the case of a foreigner, by reference to the law, not of his domicile, but
of his nationality. The religious laws thus made applicable were those of the
Moslem and Jewish faiths and of nine Catholic denominations 4 which had
sizable numbers of adherents among Palestine's citizens. Matters of "personal
status" to which not general but personal law applied, included such subjects
as marriage, divorce, guardianship and, to some extent, succession.r
The system of Palestine's courts, by and large, mirrored this basic cleavage
of the substantive law. In oversimplified terms, secular or civil courts adjudicated disputes arising under the general law, 6 and religious tribunals dealt with
disputes over personal status whenever members of their particular faith were
involved.7 Non-Palestinians brought their disputes over matters of personal
3. "The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts shall be exercised in conformity with . . .
Ottoman law ... , Orders in Council, Ordinances and Regulations . . . and subject theret.,
and so far as the same shall not extend or apply . . . in conformity with the substance
of the common law, and the doctrines of equity in force in England and . . . according
to . . . [English] . . . procedure and practice . . . Provided always that the said common
law and doctrines of equity shall be in force in Palestine so far only as the circumstances
of Palestine and its inhabitants . . . permit and subject to such qualification as local
circumstances render necessary," art. 46, Vitta 270.
4. These were the Eastern (Orthodox), Latin (Catholic), Gregorian Armenian, Armenian (Catholic), Syrian (Catholit), Chaldaean (Uniate), Greek Catholic Melkite, the
Maronite and the Syrian Orthodox communities, Vitta 284.
5. ". . . [M]atters of personal status mean suits regarding marriage or divorce,
alimony, maintenance, guardianship, legitimation and adoption of minors, inhibition from
dealing with property of persons who are legally incompetent, successions, wills and
legacies, and the administration of the property of absent persons.", Order in Council,
1922, art. 51(1), Vitta 270.
6. "Subject to the provisions of this part of this Order . . . the Civil Courts . . .
shall exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over all persons in Palestine," art. 38, Vitta 270.
7. "Moslem Religious Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of personal
status of Moslems who are Palestinian citizens or foreigners who, under the law of their
nationality, are subject . . . to the jurisdiction of Moslem Religious Courts . . . ." art. 52,
as amended;
"The Rabbinical Courts . . . shall have (i) Exclusive jurisdiction in matters of
marriage and divorce, alimony and confirmation of wills of . . . [Palestinian Jews),
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status before the civil courts.8 For present purposes it is important to note
that, while for other "matters of personal status" the jurisdiction of the religious tribunals and the civil courts was concurrent, the religious tribunals
always had exclusive jurisdiction over the marriages and divorces of Palestinians
who were members of one of the eleven enumerated religious communities.
While this substantive and jurisdictional scheme appears complete so far
as foreigners and Palestinian members of the eleven communities are concerned,
two questions remain: first, could a Palestinian shift his adherence from one
religious community to another? Or could he simply discontinue it without new
affiliation? Second, what of Palestinians who never belonged to any of the
eleven communities, such as Protestants, for example? Regarding the first
question, Palestine's law did make some provision but only for those who wished
to shift their allegiance to another community. An ordinance of 1927 prescribed
the requisite formalities for the transfer which gave the convert a new "personal" law and a new religious tribunal.9 The legislator, however, never contemplated that a withdrawal from a community without affiliation with another
could have any effect either on his "personal" law or on the jurisdiction of the
appropriate religious tribunal over him. Yet, between 1927 and 1953, the civil
courts seized on a poorly drafted provision of what was mainly intended to be
electoral regulations of the Jewish community and denied the rabbinical
tribunals jurisdiction whenever one of the parties was not listed in the community roster. 10 While the ruling had the effect of placing, in such a situation,
jurisdiction in the hands of the civil courts, Jewish law remained nevertheless,
the proper "personal law" of unlisted individuals. This anomaly which led to
grave abuses by litigants, was ended by legislation in 1953.11 On the other
hand, Palestine's law made no provision for those of her citizens who never
belonged to any of the eleven communities because they had no religion at all
(ii) Jurisdiction in any other matter of personal status of such persons, where all the
parties consent to their jurisdiction . . . .", art. 53;
"The Courts of the several Christian Communities shall have (i) Exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce, alimony and confirmation of wills of [Palestinian) . . . members of their community . . . . (ii) Jurisdiction in any other matter
of personal status of such persons, where all the parties to the action consent to their
jurisdiction . . . ."; art. 54; Vitta 271.
8. "[T]he Civil Courts shall further have jurisdiction . . . in matters of personal
status . . . [of foreigners]. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised in conformity with any
law, Ordinances or Regulations that may hereafter be applied or enacted and subject
thereto according to the personal law applicable," art. 47;
"[iatters of personal status affecting foreigners .. .sh.ll be decided by the District
Courts, which shall apply the personal law of the parties concerned . . . [and the] ...
personal law of the foreigner . . . shall be the law of his nationality unless that law
imports the law of his domicile, in which case the latter shall be applied," art. 64, Vitta
270, 272.
9. Religious Community (Change) Ordinance, 1927; for pertinent provisions and
comment, see Vitta 68-76.
10. For details, see Vitta 65-67, for a sharp critique, see Silberg, Personal Status in
Israel (1956) (in Hebrew), 62-76. This excellent book on which the writer has heavily
relied, is referred to hereafter as Silberg.
11. By the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953,
§§ 1, 4, 10; 7 Laws of Israel (author. transl.) [hereafter referred to as Laws] 139-40.
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or were affiliated with a non-recognized community. While the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts over such citizens was unquestioned, it has never
been settled whether English common law or, at least in the case of members of
12
religious groups, the religious law of their particular group should apply.
The substantive and jurisdictional dichotomy that we have described preserved an ancient Moslem and Ottoman pattern of granting limited autonomy
to the several groups of infidels who could not be converted to the Moslem
faith. 13 Significantly, the English statutory language refers to the personal
law of the "communities"; 14 the term is still apt today since the various
groups of co-religionists have remained cohesive also in the social, the economic
and the geographic sense although, as elsewhere, modern life has begun to erode
cohesion and isolation. The autonomy thus granted was restricted to those
spheres most deeply affected by religious beliefs, above all, the law of domestic
relations. The British, after accepting this pattern from their Ottoman predecessors, confined their efforts mainly to two interrelated changes: they limited
somewhat the preferred status of the Moslem tribunals and enhanced the status
of the civil courts. 15 They accomplished the latter by re-organizing the courts
along common law lines and by importing, together with English judges, English
civil and criminal procedure and the English law of evidence (but not the jury
system).
This then, in the barest outline, was the scheme of Paiestinian law on the
day when the State of Israel was established. What has happened since? Again,
we may observe a contrast between the "general" law and the "personal", i.e.,
mainly "religious" law. As regards the "general" law it is true that the State
has largely retained the broad pattern of the Mandatory period with its emphasis on English law and legal techniques, including significantly Article 46 of the
1922 Order in Council which keeps open the permanent "gateway" for the entry
into Israel of English common law and equity doctrines. This continuity was
secured by an early provision maintaining in force all existing laws, subject, of
course, to such changes as were brought about by the establishment of the State
and by future legislation. 16 However, building on the layers of Moslem, Ottoman and British law, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, has erected an impressive structure of its own making.' 7 While it proved impossible to secure
consensus on the adoption of a written constitution, the institutional, adminis12. See Perles, Problems of Religious Communities and Religions in Israel (1959),
16 Hapraklit 60 (in Hebrew); Silberg 259-63.
13. Fattal, Le Statut LUgal des Non-Musulmans en Pays d'Islam (1958), passim.
14. See, e.g., the Succession Ordinance of 1923, passim, Vitta 275-83.

15. Bentwich, Changes in the Law of Personal Status in Israel (1954), 66 Jurid. Rev.
271-74.
16. Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 1948, § 11, 1 Laws 9.
17. See generally, Yadin, Sources and Tendencies of Israeli Law (1959), U. Pa. L.
Rev. 561; Akzin, Codification in a New State, A Case Study of Israel (1956), 5 Am.
J. Comp. Law 44; Rosenne, The Constitutional and Legal System of Israel (Israel Office
of Information, 1957); Proceedings of the International Lawyers Convention in Israel

(1958).
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trative and legal framework of a modern and democratic welfare state has
been substantially completed.
In contrast, as will be noted in some detail, the Knesset has, in principle,
been content to accept, for "matters of personal status," the inherited state of
affairs. The pertinent provisions of the 1922 Order in Council which codified
the substantive and jurisdictional dichotomy of Palestine's law have remained
in force. Thus, in the area of "personal law" at least, we find a surprising continuity reaching back into the Mandatory era and, beyond it, into the distant
past of Ottoman and pre-Ottoman Palestine. Some of the implications of the
survival of this ancient scheme in modem Israel will now be explored. 18
II.
The jurisdiction of the religious tribunals over marriage and divorce, as
already noted, is exclusive. For the Jewish community, a 1953 "Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law" has re-affirmed and extended
this rule by making it applicable to all Jewish "residents" of Israel (regardless
of nationality).' 9 Implicit in this distribution of authority is the crucial principle which Palestinian and Israeli doctrine and practice have always taken for
granted although no statute spells it out, namely, that in the exercise of their
jurisdiction, the religious tribunals will apply their own, i.e., religious law.20
The significance of this principle can be gauged only in the light of the
several bodies of religious law thus made applicable. Comment here will be
largely limited to Jewish law, applicable today to ninety per cent of the population. Even with-this. limitation, space does not permit more than a sampling
of the relevant provisions. 21
1. The Jewish law of marriage and divorce shares with other religious
laws a universal character. It embraces all those whom it defines as Jews,
namely, those born of a Jewish mother2 2 and those duly converted to Judaism.2
18. The leading treatise on the subject is Silberg, supra note 10.
19. Section 1, 7 Laws 139. This law, on the other hand, confined exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts to "matters of marriage and divorce" while under article 53
(iii) of the 1922 Order in Council the rabbinical courts had also exclusive jurisdiction over
property dedicated to religious purposes, and further over alimony and confirmation of
wills, see note 7 supra; Vitta 271. In contrast, the Knesset did not modify the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Moslem and Christian courts.
20. Vitta 133; Silberg 212.
21. See generally, Amramn, The Jewish Law of Divorce (1896); Mielziner, The
Jewish Law of Marriage and Divorce (2d rev. ed. 1901); 1 Blau, Die jiidische Ehescheidung
und der jildische Scheidebrief (1911); Epstein, The Jewish Marriage Contract (1927);
Levy, Le Divorce Juif (1929), Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud (1942);
Dykan, Law of Marriage and Divorce (1956) (in Hebrew); Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish
Law (1953), §§ 140-63.
22. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud (1942), n.147 at 196.
23. In Israel definition of membership in the Jewish community is also relevant to
"general" law, such as immigration and registration statutes. A recent government regulation
issued for administrative purposes defined a Jew as "a person born of a Jewish mother
who does not belong to another religion, or one who was converted in accordance with
religious laws," see N.Y. Times, January 4, 1960, p. 3, coL 1. This administrative definition
departs from that given by Jewish law which, like many other religious laws, holds that

apostates remain members of the community.
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It is totally unaware of any "national" boundaries and notes even the existence
of other faiths only marginally: certain rules order the legal relations of Jews
with non-Jews.2 4 For instance, marriages between a Jew and a non-Jew are not
forbidden; they are simply "non-marriages" and are ignored. (Moslem "interreligious" law, by contrast, permits a Moslem man to marry a non-Moslem
wife who belongs to a monotheistic religion but denies a corresponding privilege
to a Moslem woman25.) Save for these rules, Jewish marital law rejects or,
more precisely, does not know of any law of conflicts, interreligious or secular.
It cannot, in principle, apply any law other than its own. 26 Thus the question
whether a purported marriage or divorce is valid will be determined solely
according to the rules of Jewish law, regardless of the time or place of the
purported ceremony or proceedings and regardless of the domicile or citizenship
of the parties. This approach is, of course, familiar to the Western observer
from the comparable attitude of the canon law.ar It starkly contrasts with the
notion of modem law that, normally, the state in which an individual is domiciled or the state of his nationality at the time when his marital status is established or changed, has the decisive and final word on the validity of that
status.
2. Of further critical significance in this context are rules which are discriminatory against women because they are related to the institution of polygamy which once was sanctioned by Jewish law and finally, rules that, for
other reasons, have become archaic or discriminatory or both.
Among the most arresting aspects of Jewish legal history are the unceasing efforts of scholars and rabbis toward a greater measure of equality between
husband and wife than biblical law had ordained. By the imposition of rabbinical "bans" on certain conduct, by bold "interpretation," by the insistence on
meticulous compliance with procedural formalities and by the insertion of
suitable clauses in the standardized written marriage contracts, impressive
progress has been made. The classic example is the abolition of polygamy
sanctioned by biblical law. Rabbenu a6 Gershom, a rabbinical scholar of the 11 th
century, banned polygamous marriages of Jews in Germany and France after
the practice had become rare among them; the ban was gradually accepted by
all Western Jewry.28 For divorce, a similar development can be observed. It
started with a relatively informal and unilateral biblical "repudiation" by the
24. For early, complex rules governing marriages with members of other tribes,

see Epstein, op. cit. supra note 22, passim.
25. Koran, Sfirah 11, 221; Sfirah V, S (Pickthal transl. 1953); Fattal, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 129, 133-34.

26.

Of course, the rabbinical courts of Israel recognize the laws of the State as binding,

see p. 341 infra.
26a. Rabbenu means "Our Rabbi" or "Our Teacher," an honorific title.
27. Compare the legal situation on the island of Malta where religious law is
similarly controlling with the result that Maltese courts will not recognize foreign

marriages of Catholic Maltese domiciliaries which are contracted not in accord with
canon law, see Chapelle v. Chapelle [1950] P. 134, 136-37.
28. For the text and a discussion of the ban, see Silberg 134-71.

326
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husband of an undesired wife (as is still the rule in Moslem law). Rabbenu
Gershom, along with his proscription of polygamy, also banned the unilateral
imposition of a divorce on an unwilling wife. Centuries earlier it had already
been established that, at the wife's behest, the husband could be compelled to
grant her a divorce for a variety of grounds which, in modern terms, can be
readily classified as physical or mental cruelty on his part.
Yet, it would be erroneous to conclude from these illustrations, important
as they are, that Jewish law has achieved even an approximation of equality
for women. The very nature and technique of the ameliorating efforts imposed
grave limitations on their effect. In part, the amending process was territorially
limited. For example, the ban of Rabbenu Gershom was never accepted by
the Jews in the Eastern half of the world. They thus retained the practice of
polygamy which was part and parcel of the Moslem civilization in which they
lived. Even more serious is the fact that all the bans, interpretations, formalities and draftsmen's formulae were deemed incapable of altering what was
evidently conceived to be "fundamental" marital law. Thus, a Western Jew's
unilateral divorce handed to an unwilling wife, in defiance of the ban, is valid
and terminates the marriage, however illicit in law and ethics his action has been
considered for at least 800 years. No such "privilege" of course, exists for a
wife. Similarly, a Western Jew's poljgamous marriage contracted in violation
of the explicit ban, is valid and can only be terminated by divorce while a
woman's polygamous marriage is void.
In ending polygamy Rabbenu Gershom had expressly contemplated that a
man might be granted formal permission to remarry for "clearly established"
reasons.- This was done in situations in which his second marriage would
actually not be polygamous but take the place of a prior marriage that had
been frustrated by circumstances beyond the husband's control. The permission is customarily granted in the event of the insanity or the disappearance of
a wife, situations, incidentally, with which Western laws have continued to
struggle until quite recently.30 The development of Jewish law in this context
is interesting. It found itself incapable of dealing with the problem of the
insane spouse by resorting, as many modern laws do, to the device of a divorce.
While, as noted, divorce in Jewish law is a private and not a judicial act, a
husband was deemed powerless to divorce an insane wife. Her insanity disabled
her from appointing an agent to accept it in her stead. Nor could a court empower a guardian to accept the bill on her behalf since Jewish law never developed the concept of judicial guardianship. The dilemma was resolved by
recourse to a rabbinical dispensation from Rabbenu Gershom's ban. The dispension stipulated that the husband must have duly safeguarded the maintenance
of his ailing wife and placed a bill of divorce in escrow, to be available to her
should she recover her sanity. 30 Although still married to her, the husband
29. Silberg 160.
30. Cf., e.g., N.Y. Domestic Relations Law §§ 7(5), 7-a.
Soa. Cf. the requirement of New York law established in 1928 that a husband
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may now marry another woman. 3 ' It is apparent that the very nature of the
legal device employed makes it impossible to free a wife from an insane husband. A parallel phenomenon may be observed in the situation of the missing
spouse. Again, dispensation from the ban on polygamy is available to the husband whose wife has vanished by way of desertion or otherwise. A wife whose
husband has deserted her, however, remains chained to him forever unless she
can establish his death by eye-witness testimony, a requirement that, in prac32
tice, can rarely be met.
The polygamous principle results in yet other discriminations against
women: suppose that one of the spouses had been previously married to a
Jewish mate but that the first union was terminated by a civil divorce rather
than one in accordance with Jewish law. That law, it will be noted, necessarily
considers the first marriage as continuing, the second as bigamous. But the
consequences of a bigamous second marriage differ radically depending on
whether the husband or the wife was previously married. The bigamist husband, by failing to divorce properly his first wife violates, of course, Rabbenu
Gershom's ban; yet, his second marriage, it will be recalled, though bigamous
is valid and its offspring will suffer no disability. The situation of the bigamist
wife is quite different. The result of her second marriage is nothing short of
disastrous. While the children of that marriage are illegitimate, that fact as
such is of no relevance in Jewish law because it has never discriminated against
"ordinary" illegitimates. However, these children are the fruit of an adulterous
union between a man and another man's wife; they are accordingly treated
like the offspring of a union violating biblical incest rules. Originally, they were
virtual outcasts with whom the observant Jew was enjoined to have no social
intercourse, to say nothing of inter-marriage, "to the tenth generation." 33 Even
today they may intermarry only with others equally tainted.
3. The rules concerning the issue of adulterous or incestuous unions may
serve as an extreme illustration of archaic provisions of Jewish marital law.
But there are others no less archaic which do not present similar obstacles to
enforcement. Prominent among these are certain rules embodying marriage
impediments of which there is a fairly lengthy catalog. Some of these, to use
canonical terms, are "diriment," i.e., they result in voidness of the marriage
contracted in violation of the impediment. Others may be called merely "prohibitive," i.e., they do not affect the validity of the marriage. For illustrations
we can refer to the void marriages already mentioned. Among the merely prohibitive impediments are those forbidding the marriage of a member of the
priestly tribe to a divorced woman, the prohibition against a childless widow
furnish security for the support of his insane wife before his marriage with her may be
terminated. Domestic Relations Law § 7(5).
31. Silberg 160 et seq.

32. On the concern of American rabbis with the problem, see Horowitz, op. cit.

supra note 21, § 163.
33. Deuteronomy, 23, 3; on the gradual limitation of the stigma to a marriage

impediment, see Dykan, op. cit. supra note 21, at 184-92.
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to re-marry unless her late husband's brother has first ceremonially released
her from her biblical bond to him,3 4 and finally, a variety of incest prohibitions
that have been elaborated beyond the fairly brief biblical catalog. 35 Here again,
discriminations against women are frequent.
It must be recognized that, in practice, the doctrinal distinction between
prohibitive and diriment impediments becomes less significant whenever the
law insists on the participation of a religious functionary in the marriage ceremony. If the parties can marry only in his presence, he will refuse to solemnize
the marriage whether the impediment is diriment or prohibitive. By contrast,
if a marriage can be contracted in his absence, the parties are able to marry
validly although, in doing so, they may have flouted a prohibitive impediment
and thus committed a religious offense. Here it is noteworthy that Jewish law,
like Western law, has long struggled with the problem of the informal marriage. 36 The comparable Jewish version requires the husband merely to hand
to the woman some valuable (usually a ring) and then to address the ritual
marriage formula to her, both in the presence of two orthodox witnesses.
Today, the approved Jewish marriage is ceremonial. It is solemnized in the
presence of a rabbi and marked by the signing of a standardized marriage contract. Although the informal marriage is frowned upon, nevertheless, in view of
the "fundamental" nature of this mode of marrying, if the parties manage
to contract an "informal" union, it is valid. To the extent that merely
"prohibitory" impediments can thus be defeated, it may be said that an avenue
is left open to liberalize the stringency of some of the marriage impediments.Y
As we shall later see, this avenue has been effectively blocked in Israel.38
These selected illustrations from Jewish marital law indicate that, despite
the most ingenious efforts of doctrine and practice over many centuries, there
has remained a substantial residuum of bleak inequality and archaic rules
which have become meaningless and often work injustice. Similar conclusions
could be drawn with respect to some of the substantive laws of the other religious communities, notably Moslem law which, for instance, has never been
able to end the archaic institution of polygamy or the harsh privilege of the
husband to rid himself of an unwanted wife by the simple act of repudiation. 39
34. Deuteronomy 25, 5-10.
35. Leviticus 18.
36. Originally, marriage could be contracted by mere.consent and consummation;
although still deemed capable of producing a valid union, this informal marriage was considered improper already at the time of the Talmud, see, e.g., Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew
Marriage Laws (1944), 89 et seq.
37. Cf. Cohen-Buslik v. The Attorney General, 8 Piskei Din 4 (1954) (informal
marriage before two witnesses upheld by Supreme Court); Levontin, Marriages and
Divorces out of the jurisdiction (1957) (in Hebrew) 46-7.
38. See p. 332 infra.
39. See generally, Houdas et Martel, Trait6 de Droit Musulman (1882), 259 et seq.;
2 Dulont, Trait6 de Droit Musulman et Alg6rien Moderne (2d ed. Algiers), 228 et seq.;
1 Cherbonneau, Droit Musulman du Statut Personnel (1873), 273 et seq. The United
Arab Republic has recently abolished the unilateral repudiation by the husband, by
enacting a new code which apparently limits divorce grounds to adultery and desertion,
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III.
The impact of these rules on the Jewish community of Israel is bound to
be heavy. Almost all of Israel's leaders are of European origin and have always
been open to Western secularizing influences. The same is true of perhaps half
of her present population of two million. On the other hand, for a small minority of this Western group Israeli nationalism has strong religious overtones.
It must also be recognized that the remaining half of Israel's population was
born and bred in the East, and Eastern traditionalism has shaped its outlook.
But it is apparent that this outlook has come under relentless challenge by the
rapid general development of the country and the influential attitudes of its
Western elements so that the orthodox groups are a distinct minority in Israel.
The challenge to tradition is particularly insistent in the economic and
social fields. There the equality of women, for example, is to a marked degree
an approaching achievement rather than a distant goal. Israel's labor force
consists in a substantial proportion of women. They are strongly represented
in government, politics, parliament, the learned professions and the armed
forces. Their social and economic equality has been firmly anchored by extensive legislation, in fulfillment of the promises of Israel's Declaration of Independence that the state would "insure complete equality of social and political
rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of . . . sex." 40 This development is
plainly irreversible; indeed, it is a national necessity.
Yet, the effect of Jewish matrimonial law cannot be gauged solely by considering the general character and the trends of Israel's society. We must recall
that in ideology and practice the new state is, above all, a country of immigrants. 41 Hundreds of thousands found refuge there from the Nazi holocaust.
Many of these refugees were and continue to be non-observant Jews. Many had
contracted purely civil marriages abroad with Jewish women. Some of these
women, in turn, were divorced from former Jewish spouses by "secular" or
"civil" proceedings only, in accordance with the law of their foreign domiciles.
Others had married non-Jewish spouses, either before or after their ordeal
began, spouses who often remained faithful to their Jewish mates in the face of
disaster and finally accompanied them to the Israeli haven. The same is true of
the Jews who managed to flee from oppression in Soviet Russia and her satellites
in the aftermath of World War II or have since been permitted to emigrate to
Israel. It is hardly necessary to point out that the emigrants from the communist-dominated areas and those who, it is hoped, will be permitted to leave
them for Israel sometime in the future, have been subjected, for decades, to
see N.Y. Times, February 23, 1960, p. 1, col. 8. The new code was preceded by the
abolition in Egypt, in 1955, of the religious (including Moslem) tribunals, Laws Nos.
462, 629, Official Gazettes, No. 73(b), September 24, 1955, No. 99(b), December 25,
1955 (in Arabic).
40. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, 1 Laws 4.
41. On this aspect, see particularly, Yadin, Sources and Tendencies of Israeli Law
(1959), 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561.
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government-sponsored and systematic anti-religious pressures. These pressures
have inevitably led to a wholesale disregard of Jewish precepts and rites and to
a very high rate of marriages with non-Jewish spouses.
It is not difficult, in the light of the preceding observations, to predict the
fate of these marriages should their validity ever be drawn in question before a
rabbinical tribunal. Doubtless many would turn out to be non-existent, void,
bigamous or incestuous under Jewish law. Even if most parties to such marriages manage to live out their lives without ever becoming embroiled in matrimonial litigation, the validity of their unions may be challenged even against
their desire both during and after their married life, for example, in connection
with the distribution of their estates.
These problems, as we have seen, will arise most frequently in the case of
immigrants who have contracted secular marriages or have been parties to
secular divorce proceedings in the countries of their origin. Doubtless the
harshest and least remediable consequences would be produced in such situations. Yet, the difficulties do not end there. Israel's Jewish citizens or residents
who wish to marry in Israel or elsewhere face comparable dilemmas. They
have, above all, to reckon with the long catalog of "diriment" and "prohibitive"
marriage impediments which also raise problems special to-Israel. There is, to
begin with, the plight, by no means rare, of the offspring of an immigrant
Jewish mother who, before settling in Israel, was married abroad to a Jewish
husband. The marriage was valid under the law of the matrimonial domicile
or her nationality but Jewish law deems it to be incestuous or adulterous. The
children of that union are barred, as we have seen, from intermarrying with
anyone other than a similar outcast "to the tenth generation." How their
tainted background can be discovered is impossible to determine from the distance. It is not likely, however, to be an easy task when it is recalled that
many immigrants arrived without any identification papers. Turning to the
flat non-recognition of a mixed marriage (not a true impediment, of course) it
may be argued that the ban on such a marriage is inescapable in a religious
ordering of marital relations. But what of the "diriment" impediment to the
re-marriage of an Israeli woman whose husband has deserted her somewhere in
Europe? Unless she can produce eye-witnesses to his death, it will be recalled,
she will be unable in Israel even to go through the form of a new marriage.
Consider also the parallel case of an immigrant woman who wishes to remarry and now seeks a Jewish divorce from a foriner spouse from whom she
has been divorced by a foreign judicial decree only. She will be unable to remarry if that former spouse cannot be located or refuses, safely beyond Israeli
jurisdiction, 41a to hand her the bill of divorce. Or, to shift to merely prohibitive
impediments: what of the childless widow who wishes to re-mafry but cannnot
41a. A spouse who has been ordered by a final judgment of a rabbinical court
to give or accept a bill of divorce but refuses to do so may be imprisoned, Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, § 6, 7 Laws 139.
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secure the required ceremonial release from the archaic tie4 2 to her late husband's brother if that brother's whereabouts happen to be unknown or he is
43
uncooperative and beyond the reach of the coercive processes of the Israeli
courts or if he is a minor under 13 years and thus incapable, perhaps for years,
of granting the release? To take a final example, what of the impediment
barring the marriage of a member of the priestly tribe with a divorced woman?
It is evident that 2000 years after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem
the descent from that tribe has hardly more than liturgic significance. In any
event, the unique continuity of Jewish tradition has never included, for obvious
4
reasons, the keeping of reliable private or public records that alone could
furnish a rational, trustworthy basis for rigidly adhering in this context to the
ancient classification of Jews into priests and others.
In appraising the impact of the prohibitive impediments it is important to
remember that in Israel the recourse to an informal marriage, i.e., a marriage
contracted in the absence of a rabbi, has been effectively blocked. Rabbinical
regulations enacted in 1943 forbid informal marriages within Israeli territory.4a The regulations require marriages to be celebrated solely in the presence
4
of a registered rabbi. No other marriage is entitled to official registration. "
Moreover, those participating in an unauthorized celebration, have been held
subject to criminal prosecution. 4 7 Thus, in practice, even the prohibitive impediments have become insuperable.
These then are some of the social and legal conditions under which the
marital rules of Jewish law are functioning in Israel today. These conditions
and the fact that the rules bind the observant and the non-observant alike,
sharpen, as it were, their cutting edge. This remarkable state of affairs suggests
a host of further questions only a few of which can be touched on here. Why
has the Knesset sanctioned the status quo and what else, if anything, has it
done in this area? How have the courts reacted to it? Finally, what is the
attitude of the Israeli public? The first two questions are dealt with in the
42. For a description of the release from this tie (the "levirate marriage"), see

Horowitz, op. cit. supra note 21, §§ 157-58.
43. If he is subject to Israeli jurisdiction he may be imprisoned for failure to
grant the release after having been ordered to do so, Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction
(Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, § 7.
44. The historian Africanus is quoted as having reported that "Herod burned the
archives of family registers, so as to create general confusion as to descent, and make
it easier for himself to bear the stigma of foreign origin," Epstein, op. cit. supra note 22,
189. 45. For
their Hebrew text, see Dykan, op. cit. supra note 21, 381-82.
46. Under the Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance, 1929, marriages

continue to be registered by the "registering authority," i.e., ". . . in the case of a Moslem
marriage, the Imam, a Christian marriage, the Priest, a Jewish marriage, the Rabbi .... ",
quoted from Israel Ministry of Justice, Draft Family Code (Harvard Law School transi.
1956), 192.
47. The attorney who had arranged the informal marriage between a member of
the priestly tribe and a divorcee that was held valid in Cohen-Buslik v. The Attorney
General, supra note 37, was convicted of "public mischief," The Attorney General v.
Ganor, 8 Piskei Din 833 (1954); see Gorney and Kidron, Digest of Criminal Law
(1955 Supp.) (in Hebrew) 38-39.
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succeeding sections of this article. However, we note here the response of
Israel's "man in the street" who may be unwilling to abide by one or the other
of the harsh precepts that claim his obeisance. In the light of somewhat comparable proble*ms within our own society there will be little difficulty in understanding, if not condoning, his reaction. The experience, particularly with our
own divorce legislation, has been that where the gap between the law and the
mores of the majority becomes too wide, ways and means are found of nar,
rowing it by bending the facts if the law refuses "to give." Prominent among
these, and used sometimes in combination, are, first of all, perjury, and secondly,
for those who can afford it, migratory marriages and divorces. It should therefore shock no one to learn that both devices are resorted to in Israel. How
wide-spread the practice is, is difficult to gauge from the distance. Yet, -it
has, for instance, been reliably reported that obstacles encountered in the rabbinical offices or tribunals are more or less easily hurdled by witnesses who
for a price will testify to the facts required to uphold or make possible a marriage that cannot be brought within the terms of Jewish law. Needless to say,
any deception practiced on a rabbi in connection with a "diriment impediment"
will not validate the marriage solemnized in his presence.48 It is presumably
otherwise when the impediment is prohibitive only. Of course, as is always
true of perjured testimony, it can be safely used only where the proceedings
are between "friendly" parties (as they often are) but tends to be useless or
dangerous where a real contest develops.
In view of the relative ease of Jewish divorce49 and the almost modern
character of some of the divorce grounds as contrasted with the abundance of
marriage impediments it is natural that Israelis "migrate" more frequently to
marry than to get divorced. The island of Cyprus, within easy reach of the
mainland, has long been an Israeli "Gretna Green" of sorts, a marriage haven
not only for those who cannot marry at all in Israel but also for those who
cannot bring themselves to submit to the marriage rites incumbent upon them
under Jewish law.
In the light of the previous observations this present Israeli habit raises a
further legal question. Are not new foreign marriages and divorces even more
48. Compare the instance in which a husband presented a stranger as his wife before
the rabbinical court, obtained from it approval for a divorce, handed the bill of divorce
to the stranger and then informed his wife that he had divorced her. Relying on this
statement his wife assumed that- she was free to marry another which she did and gave
birth to a child from this second "husband." When the rabbinical court learned of the
fraud, it entered a judgment requiring the second "husband" to divorce his "wife"; neither
of the two men were permitted to cohabit with the woman and the child was declared
adulterous. Later, the first husband gave his wife a genuine divorce and so did the
second "husband," eventually enabling the wife to go through a second marriage with
the new husband; their child, however, remained an adulterous child. The incident led to
a parliamentary questioning of the government, Dykan, op. cit. supra note 21, 157-58.
49. Jewish law sees nothing reprehensible in a divorce to which both parties freely
consent. Judicial concern is limited to determining the genuineness of the consent, fairness
of the property settlement and of provisions made for maintenance and custody of minor
children, Horowitz, op. cit. supra note 21, 277.
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vulnerable to the Jewish law's claim to universality than those of the immigrants previously considered since, typically, at the time of these "migratory"
transactions, the parties intend to retain their Israeli domicile? This question
will be considered together with the role of the Israeli courts, notably the
secular ones, in this troublesome field.
IV.
Two reasons stand out clearly from the complex of considerations which
led the Israeli parliament to maintain the status quo ante with respect to marriage and divorce and to re-affirm it expressly in 1953 for the Jewish majority.
The first is the recognition that Israel's population has remained a plural
society, deeply divided into religious and ethnic communities, each still living
its own life. The Jewish majority, mindful of its own status under the previous
regime. sought to assure to the present minorities the same rights that it had
enjoyed while still a minority. The second, applicable solely to the Jewish
community, is the general realization that Israel would not and could not face
the specter of a bitter struggle between its secular and religious factions
at a time when Israel's neighbors openly threatened to destroy her. The expressed concern that a formal break with the past in the area of the "religious"
law might jeopardize national solidarity among the Jewish population cannot
be dismissed as a rationalization of a political compromise with a militant,
orthodox minority. From the preceding sampling of some pertinent rules of
Jewish marital law it will be appreciated, for example, that recognition of a
secular divorce would be tantamount in the eyes of the orthodox to the creation
of a large class of outcasts, the issue of remarried Jewish women whose preceding marriages had been terminated by secular, rather than religious, divorces.
Intermarriage with these would be anathema to the faithful who, in defense of
their religious convictions, would be forced to withdraw into more or less complete social self-isolation. In this aspect, i.e., the preservation of national cohesion, the problem merges into the larger, equally unresolved issue of the
relationship of religion and state, an issue that was one of the major causes for
the shelving of a written constitution.
Yet, it must be recognized that the legislative approval of the status quo
ante has been qualified in important respects by secular statutes which deal
'directly and indirectly with the subject of marriage and divorce on a general
rather than a religious or "community" basis. It must be noted at the outset that the assertion as such of legislative power is more significant than the
substance of the measures actually taken. For it is true that, so far, these have
been largely confined to areas in which religious opposition was at a low ebb
because the new secular rules tended to promote religious values or touched on
areas which, from the religious point of view, seemed relatively insignificant.
Some, moreover, were not addressed to the religious tribunals or designed
directly to modify religious law; instead, they made criminal certain conduct
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which the religious laws declare improper or illicit or, at best, merely tolerate.
Finally, most of them met little psychological resistance since they appeared to
follow a pattern of legislative precedent already established by the Mandatory
regime.
1. Criminal law outlawing conduct tolerated by religious law. To begin
with the use of penal law, a 1950 statute made it a crime to celebrate the
marriage of a girl under 17 years.r This action sought to end the practice of
marrying girls as young as 12 years, a practice that is lawful under both
Jewish and Moslem law. Significantly, the Mandatory legislator had already
51
made it a crime to celebrate the marriage of a girl under 15 years. A similar
development occurred with respect to polygamy. A provision of the Mandatory
penal code made it a crime to contract a second marriage that "is void by
reason of its taking place during the life" of a prior spouse. The provision
exempted a husband whose personal law "allowed him to have more than one
wife". 2 Christians, in other words, were subject -to prosecutions for bigamy
and so, it was assumed until 1938, were Jews since Rabbenu Gershom's ban
was thought to apply to Palestine. In 1938, however, a Western Jew charged
with bigamy claimed that contrary to the terms of the statute his second
marriage was not void although it was contracted during the life of his first
wife. The rabbinical authorities had to agree with this contention since the
violation of Rabbenu Gershom's ban did not invalidate a polygamous marriage.
The defendant had to be acquitted. 53 In 1947 the criminal law was amended
to cope with the problem. It declared second marriages criminal even if valid
54
The perunless rabbinical permission had first been obtained to re-marry.
mission could only be secured, of course, in the exceptional circumstances discussed above. In 1951, the Knesset deleted the general exemption for husbands whose personal law permitted them "to have more than one wife" and
55
In 1959 the
thus, polygamy ended in Israel for all religious communities.
56
The amendment retained
Knesset again amended the bigamy provisions.
50. Marriage Age Law, 1950, 4 Laws 158-59. Apparently, the enforcement of the
statute has encountered resistance and therefore, a lowering of the limit for girls to 16
years and, with judicial approval, to 15 years is under consideration, Dror, Law and
Social Change (1959), 33 Tul. L. Rev. 787, 801. These limits may be compared with
those prescribed for the state of New York which sets a minimum of 16 years for girls
but permits, with judicial approval, a marriage at 14, N.Y. Domestic Relations § 15.
51. Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, § 182(b); see also § 156 which made consummation of such an under-age. marriage; in the absence of medically certified puberty,

a crime.
52. Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, § 181, quoted by Vitta 54-55.
53. The Attorney General v. Melnik, 6 Pal. L. Rep. 34 (1939).
54. Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, § 181(d), as amended; it admitted as a defense
only a final decree of a rabbinical tribunal, approved by the two Chief Rabbis for
Palestine, permitting a subsequent marriage. For the English text, see Gorney and
Kidron, Digest of Criminal Law (1953), at XL.
55. Moslem law permits but does not require marriage with four wives, in contrast
with the early Mormon creed which imposed polygamy as a religious duty. An attack
on the new law failed, Malham v. The Judge of the Moslem Court, 8 Piskei Din 910
(1954) (the court relied on Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
5Sa. Vomen's Equal Rights Law, 1951, §8(a), 5 Laws 171.
56. Law of July 20, 1959, Sefer Ha-Hukkim No. 285, of July 30, 1959 (in Hebrew).
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the immunity for re-marriages of Jews who had secured rabbinical dispensation,
and granted a similar immunity to members of other religions in cases where
the first wife was insane or missing.57 The amendment declared it immaterial
for a bigamy prosecution whether or not the second marriage was valid.58
Nor is it material, under the new law, that the first marriage is valid according
to the lex loci matrimonii or the religious law under which it was solemnized. 0
Hereafter, the Jewish immigrant who discovers that his foreign marriage is
invalid under Jewish law can no longer re-marry with impunity unless he or
she has first obtained a judicial declaration that the first marriage is at an end.00
Conversely, if he had contracted a religious marriage abroad, he cannot marry
another woman claiming that the lex loci celebrationisconsidered his first marriage as invalid.
Similarly, a 1951 amendment of the penal code 6' made it criminal for a
husband to divorce an unwilling wife unless a religious tribunal had ordered
her to accept the divorce. This provision is directed against both Moslems and
Jews, for, as we have seen, their religious laws still hold a husband's unilateral
"repudiation" of his wife valid. Significantly, no crime is committed under
that provision unless the divorcing husband accomplishes the unilaterhl severance of the marriage, a clear indication that the secular law, instead of amending religious law directly, makes criminal the exercise of a "power" granted by
that law. If exercised, however, the power remains effective to change the status
of those affected by it. The same, of course, is true of the other matrimonial
crimes just mentioned.
2. Discretionary secular controls over enforcement of certain judgments

of the rabbinical courts. Another example of indirect influence on religious law
is found in certain provisions of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage
and Divorce) Law of 1953 .62 As will be later seen,0 3 the religious tribunals
lack power to enforce their own judgments. Hence, the prevailing party must
apply to the civil courts. These, as a matter of course, make their process
available to enforce a judgment duly entered by a religious tribunal. How57. Id., §§ 5, 6.
58. Id., § 4(2).
59. "For the purpose of . . . [the commission of the crime], it shall be immaterial
(1) whether the earlier marriage is valid in accordance with the law of the state in
which it was contracted or in accordance with religious law under which it was contracted; (2) whether the new marriage is valid or null; (3) whether the new marriage
was contracted outside Israel, so long as the person who contracted it was at the
time an Israel national or resident", id., § 4 (Unoff. transl.).
60. "A person, who has been married is for the purpose of . . . [the commission
of the crime] presumed to be married unless and until he proves that his earlier marriage
has been annulled or dissolved, either by the death of the spouse or by a final judgment
of the [civil] court or the competent religious court under Jewish religious law in a manner
approved by the competent religious court, and he shall in that case be regarded as
unmarried with effect only from the time of the death or the time when the judgment
or approval was given," id., § 3.
61. Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, as amended by the Women's Equal Rights
Law, supra note 55a.
62. 7 Laws 139.
63. See page 340 infra.
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ever, the 1953 statute vests in certain situations independent discretion in both
the Attorney General and the civil courts to determine whether a judgment
of the rabbinical court should be enforced by imprisoning the recalcitrant
party. 64 In particular, this discretion is granted where the rabbinical court has
ordered a husband to give, or a wife to accept, a divorce. The purpose of the
provision is obviously to discourage the rabbinical courts from issuing such
orders in situations in which the Jewish law of divorce is felt to operate unjustly; thus, for example, there is a rule that a husband after ten years of married life, may divorce a childless wife because of her sterility. Henceforth,
the rabbinical courts are not likely to apply the rule although there has been
no formal change of the religious law or any direct interference with judicial
functions.
3. Statutory law to be observed by all courts. Next come certain statutory provisions which, at least on their face, purport to lay down rules binding
on all courts, including the religious tribunals. Thus, the 1951 law fixing the
marriage age of women at 17 years bluntly states that an under-age marriage
may be dissolved by divorce, annulment or "in any other manner, as the law
65
This
applicable to matters of personal status of the parties may provide."
or
her
parents
wife,
of
the
only
not
behest
dissolution is to take place at the
permits
law
religious
no
Since
officer.
welfare
guardians but even of a public
the dissolution of a marriage under these circumstances, this provision would
seem to amount to a legislative command amending directly the several substantive religious laws. Similarly, to digress for a moment into marital property law, another section 4 of the 1951 "Women's Equal Rights Law" lays down
the principle, long familiar from our married women's property acts, that the
property owned by a woman at the time of marriage or thereafter should be
her separate property over which she alone has full control. This provision
again appears to have substantive character. It squarely conflicts with Jewish
law which grants the husband extensive rights in his wife's property, comparable somewhat to those he enjoyed at common law. The key section
of this law also deserves brief mention. It broadly provides for full
67
The precise
equality of the sexes "with regard to any legal proceeding."
meaning of this vague phrase remains to be determined and in any event, its
application to the law of marriage and divorce will be somewhat limited, in
view of the express direction that it "shall not affect any legal prohibition or
64. This may be done, aside from the divorce situation, whenever a man refuses
to release the wife of his deceased brother from the biblical bond that arises upon his
brother's death, 7 Laws §§ 6, 7; see also pp. 331-32 supra.
65. Marriage Age Law § 3(a), 4 Laws 158-59.
66. Women's Equal Rights Law,.§ 2, S Laws 171.
67. "A man and a woman shall have equal status with regard to any legal proceeding.
Any provision of law which discriminates, with regard to any legal proceeding against
women as women, shall be of no effect.", id., § 1 (italics added). The italicized phrase
appears inadequately translated. The Hebrew original appears to mean "legal transaction"
or 'legal act."
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permission relating to marriage and divorce."886 Nevertheless, its terms would
seem to bind the religious tribunals in any context not within the express
exemption.

4. Recognition of common-law wile for purposes of welfare legislation.
To conclude the illustrations, an important provision of the National Insurance
Law of 1953 should be noted. It includes in its statutory definition of a "wife"
entitled to social security benefits "a woman commonly reputed to be the wife
of, and living with, the [insured] .".69 This inclusion of the "reputed wife"
in the definition of a wife is typical of most Israeli social and pension legislation, including a statute for the protection of tenants. 70 In a country in which
almost all are tenants and derive their income from wages, old age and veterans'
pensions and other social security payments this consistent legislative policy of
honoring claims based on de facto or "common law" marriages that are condemned by religious law, is revealing. Even if religious law ignores the social
and legal reality of such unions, the modern service state, within its area of
responsibility, cannot afford to do so.
The foregoing selection of "secular" enactments demonstrates that, despite
the retention of the status quo ante, the Knesset has been unwilling to surrender
its sovereign powers over marriage and divorce. This is evidently also the view
of the civil courts. For, as we shall see in the following section, they have
relied on Article 46, the "gateway" provision of the 1922 Order in Council, to
curb, by the application of common law rules, the universality of the religious
laws whenever they were called upon to apply them. The attitude revealed by
this statutory interpretation may be significant in itself; in any event, it tends
to foster a climate of public opinion favorable to further legislative activity in
this area. In turn, the religious tribunals, as will be seen, have not impeded the
assertion of the Knesset's authority for they seem to acquiesce in the application
of secular legislation even where it supersedes religious law.
V.
The legislative blessing for the status quo ante of the laws of marriage and
divorce could not, in the nature of the things described here, calm the troubled
waters. If anything, it tended to focus popular attention on the role played by
the judiciary in the enforcement of the rules of religious law which the legislature had refused to repeal. This role will be better understood in the light of
the characteristics and interrelations of the two judicial branches.
It is generally fair to say that Israel's religious tribunals live in a world of
their own. The judges, following intense religious training are designated by
68. Id., § 5; the quoted phrase, in Hebrew a term of art, refers mainly to the body
of rules concerning marriage impediments and exemptions or dispensations from them.
69. National Insurance Law, § 1(a), 8 Laws 4.
70. Tenants Protection Law, 1955, § 1, 9 Laws 172; for a list of the numerous
statutes containing the same provision, see Dykan, op. cit. supra note 21, 94-95; see
generally, Malchi, The Quasi-Wife (1957), 13 Hapraklit 234 (in Hebrew).
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the hierarchies of their faiths and then confirmed by the state. So far as the
rabbinical tribunals are concerned, the legislature has made a major effort to
assimilate the method of selecting the judges and their tenure as nearly as
possible to those provided for the civil judges. 71 Under a 1955 statute,72 they
are appointed by the President, following the recommendations of a representative, standing selection committee, a technique which deliberately seeks to
minimize political influences on the appointive process. The appointees are, of
course, selected with a view to strict orthodoxy. They hold office for life and
may not engage in non-judicial activities. The judges usually have had little,
if any, secular education. Religion dominates their outlook on life and law.
They are familiar only with Jewish law which has molded their legal techniques
and, more broadly, their habits of mind.73 Naturally enough, these tribunals
are strongholds of uncompromising conservatism. If they show awareness of
the grave effects produced by some of the rules of Jewish law, their response,
if any, could only be discerned within narrow limits of fact-finding. In any
event, it is apparent that they contribute little to any possible development of
the marital law toward greater equality and justice.
The Israeli secular or civil judges, on the other hand, share the status,
the judicial attitudes, the esprit de corps and above all, the popular prestige
of common law judges anywhere. They are usually graduates of secular universities. If many of their number were originally trained in one or the other
of Europe's civil law systems, the local common law tradition of nearly forty
years' standing continues to exert a strong influence on all. As we have seen,
they are still required, as were the Mandatory judges before them, to apply
English common law and equity whenever local law yields no rule of decision;
they remain bound by most English rules of procedure and evidence. While
their knowledge of the common law equals that of their brethren in common
law jurisdictions, few consider themselves expert in the vast and intricate field
of Jewish law. Fewer still appear to be as orthodox in their religious beliefs as
their colleagues in the rabbinical tribunals..
These contrasts between the judiciary of the two branches are important;
so is the ambivalence of their interrelations. The 1922 Order in Council which
codified the dual system may have contemplated complete independence, within
their sphere, for the religious tribunals. This legislative intent appears to be
71. The judges of the civil courts (including the magistrates) are appointed by
the President for life, upon the proposal of a standing selection committee presided
over by the Minister of justice. The committee is composed of three judges, two cabinet
members, two members of the Knesset and two representatives of the Israeli Bar
Association; the statute, inter alia, requires extensive legal experience of the candidates,
Judges Law 1953, §§ 2 et seq., 7 Laws 125; the jurisdiction, composition and functions
of the courts have been defined in the Courts Law, 1957, 11 Laws 157-67.
72. Dayanim [Rabbinical Judges] Law, 1955, 9 Laws 74; for obvious reasons, the
Knesset has not made rules for selecting and qualifying judges of the other religious
tribunals; their salaries, howver, are paid by the state.
73. Recent regulations, however, require new appointees to be familiar with the
basic laws of the state.
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reflected in several firmly established doctrines: first, no civil court will review
a religious tribunal's decision for an alleged error in interpreting religious
law; 74 second, if a matter within a religious tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction
arises incidentally before a civil court, the latter will not submit the religious
law phase of the controversy to the appropriate religious court but will decide
the issue for itself; but in doing so, it must apply the appropriate religious
law. 75 It may be assumed although the issue does not appear to have arisen
that the civil courts, not being experts in the matter and only incidentally
concerned, will accept the interpretation of religious law adopted by the religious tribunals rather than attempt to weigh the source material independently. In any event, once a case has completed its passage through the civil courts,
the issue of error in applying religious law is foreclosed: no appeal lies from a
civil court to a religious tribunal.
Yet, there are important countervailing aspects. The religious tribunals
lack enforcement machinery of their own; their orders and judgments can only
be executed by the process of the civil courts. 76 The jurisdiction of the latter is
considered general and residual; 77 hence he who asserts religious jurisdiction
must plead and prove it. By statute or established practice, the civil courts
police, as it were, the jurisdiction of the religious tribunals. Civil judges ultimately decide jurisdictional conflicts between religious tribunals and between
the civil courts and religious tribunals. 78 The civil courts will refuse to execute
a religious tribunal's order or judgment which they consider invalid either because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, was improperly constituted or because
70
the proceeding did not accord "natural justice," i.e., procedural due process.
74. Vitta 123.
75. "Where in any civil or criminal cause brought before the Civil Court a question
of personal status incidentally arises the determination of which is necessary for the
purposes of the cause, the Civil Court may determine the question, and may to that
end take the opinion, by such means as may seem most convenient, of a competent
jurist having knowledge of the personal law applicable," art. 47(2) Vitta 270, and
135-144. The provision has been superseded by the Courts Law, 1957, § 48(8) which
provides: "In any proceeding duly brought before the Civil Court in which an issue incidentally arises the determination of which is necessary for a disposition of the cause
the Civil Court may decide it for the purposes of the cause even though the subject

matter involved in the issue is within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court or another
religious tribunal" (italics added, the translation is the writer's).
76. "The judgments of the Religious Courts shall be executed by the process and
offices of the Civil Courts." Order in Council, art. 56, Vitta 272. For details, see id.,
120-132. It was not until 1956 that the religious tribunals were empowered to summon
parties and witnesses to appear before them and to compel their attendance by issuing

warrants of arrest; they may now also fine witnesses (in amounts up to IP. 75) for
refusal to testify, Religious Courts (Summons to Court) Law, 1956, 10 Laws 110.
77. Vitta, note 9 at 152; see also Order in Council, arts. 38, 47, Vitta at 270.

78. If an action of personal status involved members of different communities, the

Chief Justice [now the President] of the Supreme Court will, on application of a party,
determine which court or tribunal shall have jurisdiction; however, if the issue is
whether a matter of personal status is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a particular
religious tribunal then a "Special Tribunal" will decide, on referral by the court or application by a party. That tribunal consists of two Supreme Court judges and the
highest judge (or a religious judge assigned by him) of the tribunal involved, Order in
Council, art. 55; Vitta 33-9, 234, 272.

79. See generally, Vitta 125-32.
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The same three grounds will cause the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a "High
Court of Justice" 80 to issue, upon the application of an aggrieved party, writs
of prohibition and mandamus to the religious tribunals. It is not surprising,
then, to find that the religious courts have become reconciled to the application
of the "general" law of the State insofar as it is declared binding on them. In
part this attitude may have become traditional during the Ottoman and Mandatory periods during which secular legislation successfully displaced, to some
extent, religious law in the field of succession. 81 In part, it may be due to a
realization on the part of the religious tribunals that, ultimately, they must
bow to the inevitable. There have been clear hints from the Israeli Supreme
Court that it would consider a religious tribunal's judgment based on an open
refusal to apply a binding secular law as in "excess of jurisdiction" and hence
deny it enforcement. 82 As we have seen, the Knesset itself authorized the
Attorney General and the civil courts to prevent, at their discretion, the enforcement of certain judgments of the rabbinical courts. Conceivably the willingness of the religious tribunals to acquiesce may end where "fundamental
principles" are involved. So far, the Knesset has shown no signs of any mood
to force a test.
Yet, despite all these qualifications of the power of the religious tribunals,
the role of the civil courts in matters of marriage and divorce would seem to be
narrowly circumscribed. They certainly do not enjoy the freedom of England's
common law judges before 1857 to accept or reject, in disposing of the common
law issues before them, an ecclesiastical tribunal's decision on the marital status
of a party.8 3 Once an Israeli religious tribunal has decided, the civil courts are
bound by that decision in any case in which the matter arises incidentally. But
what if the religious tribunal has not yet been asked to decide? It is precisely
at this point that one of the most difficult issues of Israeli law has arisen. The
issue has two aspects. In its first, a problem in the choice of law is presented,
in the second, the question is whether the civil courts must apply the substance
only of religious law or also its procedure.
It will be recalled that under the terms of the 1922 Order in Council an
individual's personal law will determine his "matters of personal status," including marriage and divorce.8 4 "Personal law" however, in the case of a
citizen, has always been taken to mean the religious law of his particular community.8 5 In the case of a foreigner, the Order in Council explicitly states that
80. "The Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine such matters as are not causes or trials but petitions or applications
not within the jurisdiction of any other Court and necessary to be decided for the
administration of justice, Order in Council, 1922, art. 46, 3 Laws of Palestine (Drayton
Comp. 1934) at 2579. The mandamus powers of the Supreme Court vis-h-vis the religious
tribunals were strengthened by § 7(b) (4) of the 1957 Courts Law, supra note 71.
81. See the Ottoman Land Law and the Succession Ordinance of 1923, Vitta 195 et seq.
82. Beria v. Sheik Mussa Tabri, 9 Piskei Din 1193 (1955); Silberg 421-23.
83. Cf. Regina v. Millis, 9 H. of L. Cas. 319, 8 EngI. Rep. 844 (1843); 2 Pollock
and Maitland, The History of English Law (1911) 369-74.
84. See p. 322 supra.
85. Vitta 135.
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his "personal law" normally is the law of his nationality (rather than of his
domicile).S6 As a result, in the typical' situation of an immigrant, there will
usually be a transition from the secular law of his country of origin to the
religious law of the particular community in Israel with which he is affiliated.
For Jewish law, as we have seen and any other religious law that claims
universal application this transition is irrelevant. If, for example, an immigrant
had married before his immigration in accordance with the precepts of his
religion, the Israeli religious tribunal of his faith will consider that marriage as
valid whatever the law of his former domicile or nationality or indeed the lex
loci matrimonii may have been. Suppose, on the contrary, that that marriage
was celebrated not by a religious ceremony but according to the civil law,
either of the domicile or nationality at the time or the place of celebration?
Again, the answer is devastatingly simple. As far as the religious tribunal is
concerned, there has never been any marriage of which it can take notice. From
its vantage point it is idle to talk about a retroactive destruction of a validly
acquired status-the status never existed.
-e the answers in Israel's civil courts the same? In the absence of clear
legislative guidance this question has presented the civil courts with a most
perplexing dilemmasT Interestingly, while the issue was always lurking in the
traditional jurisdictional and substantive scheme it was not until mass immigration began that the courts had to face it squarely.8 8 Even so, only a few
decisions have so far struggled to find a solution and much remains as yet
unanswered.
1. In Tenenbaum v. Tenenbaun, s9 a decision of the Palestine period,
the defendant, a Jewish national of Czechoslovakia, before coming to Palestine,
had divorced his first Jewish wife by a religious divorce and then had married
the plaintiff, also Jewish, in a religious ceremony. Later, the couple migrated to
Palestine and acquired Palestinian citizenship. Defendant became aware that
under Czechoslovak law his religious divorce from his first wife was invalid.
Accordingly, he obtained a second divorce from her, again under Jewish law,
which now had become his "personal law." He then sought to solemnize another Jewish marriage with the plaintiff, evidently because he believed that his
marriage to her, at a time when he was undivorced from his first wife, was
invalid. The Rabbinate, however, viewed his first (Jewish) marriage to plaintiff as valid and hence refused to repeat the solemnization; instead, it arranged
a "re-enactment" of the original marriage and then issued the parties a mar86. "The personal law of the foreigner . . . shall be the law of his nationality
unless that law imports the law of his domicile, in which case the latter shall bQ
applied.", art. 64(ii), Vitta 272.
87. Silberg 211, 230.
88. But see Bichowski v. Lambi-Bichowski, 8 Pal. L. Rep. 228 (1940) which declared!

valid the marriage of a Palestinian Jew with a non-Jewish woman in Cyprus in part be.,
cause the lex loci matrimonii deemed it valid. For a critique, see Vitta 251-52; see alsq
Neussihin v. Neussihin, infra, note 90.
89. 13 Pal. L. Rep. 201 (1945); for comment, see Silberg 219-21; Levontin, Foreigrt
Judgments and Foreign Status in Israel (1954), 3 Am. J. Comp. Law 199, 208.
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riage certificate. o Later plaintiff applied to the civil court to have her marriage
to defendant annulled on two grounds: (1) her foreign marriage to the defendant was bigamous and void since at that time he was not yet validly
divorced from his first wife; (2) the "re-enactment" following the defendant's
second (valid) divorce from his first wife was ineffectual under Jewish law to
create a marital relationship with plaintiff. The district court agreed with the
plaintiff's contention that under the applicable Jewish law the "re-enactment"
had no legal significance. Yet it held that, upon their acquisition of Palestinian
citizenship, the plaintiff's first marriage to the defendant must be deemed valid
under Jewish law which had become the "personal law" of the parties. Accordingly, he dismissed her complaint.- On appeal, his judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court but his reasoning was rejected: the significance of plaintiff's first marriage to the defendant must be determined in the light of the law
applicable to the parties at that time, i.e., Czechoslovak law. Under that law
it was bigamous and void. But the Court accepted the certificate of the Rabbinate as a validation of that marriage. This validation was conclusive because
now both parties were subject to Jewish law and the rabbinical authorities.
2. In the second, and most famous case, Skornik v. Skornik,9 1 defendant,
a Polish Jew, married a Jewish wife in Poland in accordance with Polish law,
but without observing a religious ceremony. The couple later settled in Israel
and became stateless, with the result that Jewish law was deemed to be their
"personal law." The husband sued his wife in the civil court in a tort action
whereupon she counterclaimed for support. The principal issue was the validity of their Polish marriage. If it was valid the wife was not only entitled to
support but was also immune to her husband's tort action. While in the Tenenbaum case the foreign marriage was invalid under the "national law" then
applicable to the parties, the reverse was true here. In the light of Jewish law
now applicable as the "personal law" of the parties the marriage in the Tenenbaum case was valid whereas the Skornik marriage was invalid. The civil
district court entered judgment for the wife. In upholding the secular marriage
in Poland, it observed:
Polish law governs as to occurrences during the Polish phase; Jewish
law governs as to occurrences during the Israeli phase. Jewish law is
not at liberty to reopen transactions carried out and to control a status
acquired during the Polish phase because the private international law
of Israel does not seek the opinion of Jewish law as to the validity of
status acquired in Poland. 92
90. In Neussihin v. Neussihin, 4 Pal. L. Rep. 373 (1937), the Supreme Court of
Palestine upheld a decedent's marriage in a contest over his estate. Before immigrating to
Palestine he had married in Germany in accordance with Jewish but not German
law. Jewish law did not become his "personal" law until after he had settled in
Palestine. Following his arrival in Palestine, the rabbinical court had issued him a certificate
declaring that he had been validly married in Germany.
91. 8 Piskei Din 141 (1954); for extensive comments see Silberg 226-230, 237-242
and passim.
92. The translation is taken from Levontin, loc. cit. note 89, at 209.
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This result, the court thought, was also demanded by public policy since Israel
had become a member of the international community of states and as such was
presumably desirous of conforming to international custom and comity. On
appeal, its judgment was affirmed. The three judges of the Supreme Court
panel sitting in the case wrote three different opinions. Deputy President
Olshan pointed to Article 47 of the Order in Council which vests the civil
courts with jurisdiction in matters of personal status. 93 As he construed the
article it does not forbid the application of the principles of private international law. On the contrary, under its terms the civil courts are required to
exercise their jurisdiction
"... in conformity with any law, Ordinances, or Regulations that may
hereafter be applied or enacted and subject thereto according to the
personal law applicable. . . ." [italics added]
Since the legislator failed to deal with the problem presented by any "law ...
hereafter enacted," the judge held that among the laws "hereafter to [be] ...
applied" was Article 46, the "gateway" provision of the Order in Council with
its reference to the principles of common law, including the private international
law of England. This reasoning led him to uphold the Polish marriage as valid.
judge Agranat did not read the quoted portions of Article 47 as containing any reference to Article 46 or to any other legislation then existing. As he
saw it, Article 47 merely contemplated future legislation which in fact, was
never enacted. He thought that the "gateway" provision of Article 46 could
be invoked here directly, without reliance on Article 47. While the latter refers
to "the personal law applicable" it is silent on the question of which personal
law was to control in the case of a shift, here from Polish to Jewish law. The
answer, as in any other case in which local law is silent, is to be found in
Article 46. In contrast to the common law which determines status in the light
of the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage, Israeli law-by way of
analogy-must do so in the light of the law of nationality at that time. Thus,
he. too, concurred in upholding the validity of the Polish marriage.
Judge Witkon did not agree with the approach taken by his fellow judges.
For him the issue of the validity of the Polish marriage was simply one of Jorm,
not of capacity. Since the lex loci matrimonii, i.e., Polish law upholds the
marriage, it is valid in Isarel. To him, therefore, both the "personal law" of
the parties and their shift of domicile were irrelevant since we are concerned
with the law of the place of the ceremony which alone controls. In justifying the
application of the lex loci matrimonii he, too, resorted to Article 46. He noted
that the application of private international law may result in conflicting determinations of status depending on whether religious or civil jurisdiction was
93. "The Civil Court shall further have jurisdiction, subject to the provisions
contained in this part of this Order, in matters of personal status, as defined in Article
51, of persons in Palestine. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised in conformity with any
law, Ordinances or Regulations that may hereafter be applied or enacted and subject thereto
according to the personal law applicable.", art. 47; Vitta 270.
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invoked. In his view, that unfortunate situation could be remedied by having
the religious courts join with the civil courts in the application of the rules of
private international law.
3. Hershenhorn v. The Attorney General94 involved a prosecution for
bigamy. The accused had contracted a first Jewish marriage in Soviet Russia
and, after his immigration to Israel, a second Jewish marriage with another wife
in Israel. The issue was similar to that in Tenenbaum since the first (foreign)
marriage was valid under Jewish law but invalid under the foreign (Russian) law
of his nationality at the time. Again, the Supreme Court held that the "personal
law" applicable to the accused at the time of the marriage was controlling, i.e.,
the law of Soviet Russia, and hence acquitted him since that law considered
his first marriage invalid. Only two of the judges wrote opinions. Judge Silberg
justified the holding in these terms:
The domiciliary principle of English law attaches, as everybody knows,
the element of time to the element of place, and determines the validity of a transaction according to the point of contact between them.
The same is true of the nationality principle of Palestine's law. What
difference is there between the two [in this respect] ? Does the nationality principle operate without limits in time or can it more readily
dispense with this important basic factor? 95
The time limitation which Judge Silberg found implicit in the English concept
of domicile furnished him the key to the statutory concept of a foreigner's
"personal law" to which Article 64 refersY 6 For President Qlshan, on the other
hand, the issue presented a narrow problem of characterization. As he read
the bigamy section of the penal code, its references to "husband" and "wife"
are meant to be purely secular terms and thus require a first marriage valid in
accordance with the law of nationality. He left open the question whether in a
civil case he would not uphold a Jewish marriage, invalid under the law then
applicable to the parties, but valid under the Jewish law that has since become
their "personal law" in Israel.97 It may be noted that, in one respect, the Hershenhorn case went further than Skornik: while the foreign law in Skornik was
invoked to uphold a marriage, it was used in Hershenkorn to invalidate it. It
was presumably the latter decision which caused the Knesset in 1959 to amend
the law of bigamy, as noted above.Ps Under the terms of the amended statute,
Hershenhorn, of course, would have been convicted since his foreign marriage,
while invalid according to the lex loci celebrationis, 'was valid "in accordance
with the religious law under which it was contracted."
94. 8 Piskei Din 1300 (1954), see comments by Silberg 233-235.
95. The translation is the writer's, based on the quotation appearing in Silberg at 235.
96. ". . . (Mlatters of personal status affecting foreigners . . . shall be decided by
the District Courts which shall apply the personal law of the parties concerned ....
The personal law of the foreigner . . . shall be the law of his nationality unless that
law imports the law of his domicile, in which case the latter shall be applied.", art. 64;
Vitta at 272.
97. Cf. Neussiin v. Neussihin, supra note 90.
98. See pp. 335-36 supra.
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As will be seen from the foregoing, the several judges reached identical
conclusions by divergent interpretations of the slender statutory footing afforded them by the 1922 Order in Council. Yet, the differences in approach
serve only to underscore the considered concurrence on one principle: the civil
courts are required, within the sphere of their incidental jurisdiction to curtail
the universal claims of religious law by determining marital status in the light
of the "personal law" of the parties (usually the law of nationality) applicable
at the time of the transaction.
The further question whether, in applying religious law, the civil courts
must also follow the procedural and evidentiary rules of the religious law applicable was thought to be much less troublesome. The answer was clearly
negative. Palestine's and Israel's civil courts have long held that, in applying
religious law, they are bound to follow their own procedure and their own rules
of evidence. No explicit statutory warrant for this firmly established practice
is available. During the Mandatory period, it was simply taken for granted.90
When the Israeli Supreme Court was finally pressed to justify the practice,' it
relied on an analogy to the "personal law" of a foreigner, which, of course, is
the law of his nationality. Its reasoning was as follows: nobody had ever
doubted that in the foreigner's case only the substantive provisions of his law
of nationality were applicable while the forum's own rules of procedure and
evidence governed. In the light of the unchallenged practice with respect to
foreign law, the "personal law" of the citizen, i.e., the religious law of his community, cannot lay claim to any broader application. In any event, while the
pluralism of Israel's society, with its deep religious, ethical and cultural cleavages, may justify the application of different substantive religious laws, the
cleavages do not similarly warrant the application of distinct rules of procedure
and evidence which are, after all, a judicial concern and function rather than a
"right" of the parties. How does this practice 2 of "qualifying" the applicable
religious law affect the law of marriage and divorce? The extent to which the
failure of the civil courts to observe religious procedural and evidentiary rules
results in decisions which conflict with those to be anticipated from the religious
tribunals is a matter of speculation. While the Jewish law of evidence, for
instance, is characterized by extensive disqualifications of witnesses (among the
incompetent are women, religious transgressors, the parties to the lawsuit and
their close relatives) this shortcoming is largely overcome by the elastic character of Jewish procedure3 which often permits the informal "hearing" even of
disqualified witnesses. As regards women in particular, the 1951 "Women's
99.

For the practice in Palestine, see Vitta 140-41.

1. Kotick v. Wolfson, 5 Piskei Din 1341, 1344-1345 (1952), noted by Silberg 213-14.
2. The Supreme Court has summarized it in the formula: "Jewish law as applied
by the civil courts is not like Jewish law applied by the rabbinical courts" (translation
the writer's) per Silberg, J. in Cohen-Buslik v. The Attorney General, 8 Piskei Din 4, 19
(1954). While it singles out Jewish law, the same approach, of course, will be followed
for other religious laws.
3. Horowitz, op. cit. supra note 21, § 652.
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Equality Law" appears to have swept away whatever obstacles may have
existed in the rabbinical courts to the presentation of their testimony. Similar
observations may hold true of the other religious laws. In sum, the suggestion
is hazarded that this particular qualification will rarely be crucial.
The problem is quite different when we come to the qualification engrafted
on religions law by conflicts doctrines. Here the implications, not yet fully
developed, of the Skornik doctrine seem to be far-reaching. At first blush, all
foreign marriages, including those incestuous under religious law, and those of
individuals with a prior divorce based merely on a secular decree and all
foreign divorces would appear to be sanctioned by the civil courts, at least
where the particular marital status was validly acquired or terminated under
the then applicable "personal law." As a result, the clash with the religious
tribunal is total and on a wide front.
There are, however, indications that the Supreme Court may lessen the
conflict produced by the Skornik doctrine by qualifying it in various ways.
The most obvious are these:
1. Although no more than obiter dicta4 are available at this time it is
likely that the Court will uphold a marriage (and perhaps even a divorce) that
is not valid under any of the applicable foreign laws. This situation will arise
where the marriage (or divorce) was performed in accordance with the religious
law of the parties which has become their "personal law" after they have settled
in Israel. It seems that in pronouncing these dicta the judges were primarily
concerned with marriages of Jews solemnized under Jewish law in Europe during the Nazi holocaust when they literally lived beyond the pale of all secular
law. Yet, this approach may well be generally followed. 5 As we have seen it
has already found legislative expression as a weapon against bigamists in the
1959 amendments to the bigamy statutes.0
2. While the Court will presumably recognize the validity of a foreign
secular divorce, a later marriage in Israel of a Jewish divorcee to another
man is likely to be held invalid not only by the rabbinical courts, but by the
Supreme Court as well. For the fact that the civil courts will recognize a secular foreign divorce does not endow a woman domiciled in Israel with the
requisite capacity under Jewish law to remarry, a capacity which only a proper
Jewish divorce can restore to her. A civil district court has already so held.7
Presumably, comparable situations will arise.
3. So far, the doctrine has been applied only to individuals who at the
time of the purported marriage or divorce were nonresident foreign nationals
or foreign domiciliaries. Will it be extended to require the recognition of purely
4. See those of President Olshan and judge Agranat discussed in Silberg 236 et seq.
5. Neussihin v. Neussihin, supra note 90, and Tenenbaum v. Tenenbaum, both decided
during the Mandatory regime might be helpful in such a development.
6. See pp. 345-46 supra.
7. Fried v. Fried, 8 Pesakim Mehosi'im 95 (1952), quoted with approval in Silberg
251-52.
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secular marriages contracted by Israeli domiciliaries abroad who have complied
with the lex loci matrimonii? Since it is an English conflicts doctrine that is
being applied, only the formal validity of the foreign marriage will presumably
be upheld while capacity would remain to be determined by the religious law
applicable to them. It will be recalled that Judge Witkon in the Skornik case
3
considered this the only sensible approach to the problem. If he is joined by
other judges, secular "migratory" marriages will be upheld although the religious tribunals will ignore them. It is presumably the anticipation of such a
ruling by the civil courts which sustains, to some extent, the current vogue of
Israeli "Gretna Green" marriages in Cyprus and other foreign jurisdictions.
In sum, the dichotomies that exist in Israel's law and judicial branches
may, at times, result in a marriage or divorce valid in one set of courts, invalid
in another. This is a grave situation. It is somewhat akin to the difficulties
created by the refusal of the English common law courts to accept as conclusive
0
the ecclesiastical courts' recognition of certain informal modes of marriage.
Or to use an analogy even less precise, it is comparable to the anomalies that
0
used to be produced by the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.' Yet, in the light of
these parallels, the power of the Israeli secular courts seems to be limited: as
we have seen, they determine marital status only incidentally; exclusive jurisdiction over marriages and divorces lies with the religious tribunals whose determination of status is binding. Even if a civil court reaches a final decision,
its incidental determination of status does not bind the parties in subsequent
litigation in the religious tribunals." In other words, the civil court's ruling on
status is tentative, subject to being defeated by any interested party who, by
recourse to the appropriate religious tribunal, can obtain a final and presumably
favorable determination. Thus, the civil courts would seem to be able to rule
on status with any degree of permanency only in those cases in which the
parties, for reasons of their own, shun matrimonial litigation in the religious
tribunals.
The anomalies to which the Skornik doctrine may lead, and more seriously
perhaps, its limited legal effect are in themselves enough to raise some doubts
about its soundness. It was perhaps inevitable that it would be challenged. In
1957 Professor Levontin of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University launched
a sharp attack on the doctrine.' 2 He did so not from the point of view of re13
ligious orthodoxy but as a "legal craftsman."' His intellectual weapons seem
8. Pp. 344-45 supra.
9. See note 83 supra.
10. 16 Pet. 1 (1842). It held that federal courts which exercised jurisdiction on the
ground of diversity of citizenship between the litigants need not apply the common
law as declared by the highest court in the state but were free to exercise their own
judgment as to what that common law was.
11. Cf. Restatement of Judgments, § 71, comment f. This rule now applies in Israel
to every type of litigation, Courts Law, 1957, § 48(8), supra note 75.
12. Levontin, On Marriages and Divorces Out of the Jurisdiction (1951) (in
Hebrew) [hereinafter referred to as Levontin].
13. Id. at 50.
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to be taken largely from the arsenal built up by the American realists during
the earlier assault on Swift v. Tyson and the later elaboration of the Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins'4 doctrine.
Basically, his thesis is that Israel's relegation of jurisdiction over the
marriages of Israelis to religious law is such an overriding legislative policy that
there is no room whatever for divergent rulings by the civil courts when matters
of marital status come incidentally before them. In the light of this approach
he rejects the notion that religious law in the civil courts can ever be anything
but identical with the religious law in the religious tribunals. 15 Professor
Levontin sees, therefore, no merit in a mechanical distinction between the
"substance" and "procedure" of religious law and does not accept the asserted
rule that the civil courts may disregard the procedural and particularly the
evidentiary rules of religious law. Instead, he urges that these procedural
and evidentiary rules be followed whenever they are likely to affect the
outcome of an issue to be determined by religious law. In such a situation,
he would permit the civil courts to follow civil procedure only if observance of
the religious procedure would gravely affect the court's function or would
violate public policy which would militate against the complete dominance of
religious law in this area. 16
He similarly rejects the argument that a secular court is required by
the law of conflicts to reach determinations of status which differ from those a
religious tribunal would reach. Reasoning from a close examination of dicta
and arguments in a number of English cases-direct precedents appear to be
lacking-he concludes that in the law of conflicts a change of the "personal
law" may well result in a change of personal status--or to put it differently,
that a retroactive application, in matters of marriage and divorce, of the rules
of religious law, is perfectly consistent with the law of conflicts.' 7 He accordingly insists that the civil courts follow the holdings of the religious court faithfully, without any reservations. In the light of this thesis it is hardly surprising that he should further reject recognition of an Israeli domiciliary's
foreign marriage unless it is valid under Jewish law. In his view, the lex loci
celebrationis, in English law, is no more than a secondary rule, operating, as
it were, with the approval of the "personal law" which alone has ultimate

control. Whenever Jewish law is the personal law applicable, it considers the
lex loci as irrelevant, and with it falls the distinction, implicit in its use,
between "mere" form and the substantive validity of a marriage. This dis14. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The case overruled Swift v. Tyson, and, requires the federal
district courts in diversity cases to follow the common law as declared by the highest
court of the state in which they sit. This leaves the scope of the law applicable to be
determined, particularly the law that may be classified as "procedure"; see, e.g., Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Tunks,
Categorization and Federalism: Substance and Procedure After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
34 11. L. Rev. 271 (1939).
15. Levontin 23, 28, 60, 67.
16. Id., 67-72.
17. Id., 81-90.
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tinction may be appropriate to the English concept of marriage in which
consent is the essential thing while the ceremony is a secondary matter.
Jewish law, however, like other religious laws, does not know of any distinction
between these aspects of a marriage. Hence, there is no occasion in Israel, in
this context, to invoke the lex loci.18 By the same token, he approves the inclination of the civil courts to uphold Jewish marriages wherever validly
celebrated even though they fail to comply with the lex loci.10 To him, then,
the Israeli custom of going to Cyprus to get married is largely a futile exercise.
Professor Levontin's critique of the Skornik doctrine goes even further.
He appears to reject the use of private international law altogether. He challenges the assumption that a recourse to it is required for the asserted reason
that local law yields no rule of decision. In his view, Article 46, the "gateway))
provision of the 1922 Order in Council is inapplicable because the existing jurisdictional and substantive scheme for marriages and divorces represents or
implies a c:negative" rule of decision (a rule, that is, precluding the use of the
in
law of conflicts). In any event, he points out that if any lacuna exists, it is
20
the religious and not in the secular law to which alone that provision refers.
Professor Levontin is not content with this doctrinal attack. He
strongly implies that the judges are at bottom engaged in a bit of misguided
social engineering. 2 ' They seem to have felt, he suggests, that in fairness and
justice Mrs. Skornik should have support from the man whom she thought she
had married. To secure her that support the judges resorted to the clumsy
device of declaring the couple married. Professor Levontin, picturesquely,
22
compares this judicial technique to an attempt "to kill a fly with a gun-shot."
If indeed the so-called husband ought to pay for Mrs. Skornik's support,
simpler techniques could be devised or, perhaps, the matter should be referred
to the legislature.
Space does not permit an examination of the merits of Professor Levontin's
critique of which the foregoing is only a brief summary. All that can be done
here is to note a few questions that his arguments suggest. First of all, are the
incidental rulings of the civil courts on marital status as futile as he implies?
This may be true where at least one spouse is bent on destroying the marriage
and has no inhibition against bringing a matrimonial action in the religious
tribunals. But it would seem difficult, if not impossible, for third parties to
challenge the marriage in the rabbinical courts because their jurisdiction is
limited to matrimonial litigation. In any event, even if the rulings of the civil
courts are as tentative as he suggests, they lend the prestige of the civil law
and the civil courts not merely to the particular marriage but to others similarly
situated.
18. Id., 93 et seq.
19. Id., 116.
20. Id., note 59 at 36.
21. Id., 91-92.
22. Id., 91.
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As to the merits one may wonder whether Professor Levontin is not asking
too much when he pleads for a wholesale adoption of religious procedural law?
It is arguable that the civil "forum" should adopt a procedural rule of religious
law in certain circumstances: where the rule has a policy objective that will
consistently operate in favor of one or the other party. But this is certainly not
true, for example, of the wholesale disqualifications of witnesses in the Jewish
law of evidence: such disqualifications will in one case favor a plaintiff, in the
other, a defendant. It must be realized that the adoption of such exclusionary
rules, even for a limited purpose, would impair the integrity of the civil court's
fact-finding process.
The reader may further wonder how impressive the support is that Professor Levontin claims to find in the English cases23 for his thesis that a change
of domicile, under Israeli law, must result in a destruction of marital
status acquired at the former domicile (or under the former nationality). Is
it not too much to ask the civil courts to enforce the religious "universality"
rule whose harshness Professor Levontin does not fully explore? Is it really
simply a matter of providing support for a wife after the condemned marriage,
23. Most American cases that have refused to recognize the validity of a marriage
valid at the place where performed, involve migratory marriages, many of them designed
to evade domiciliary restrictions against incest, miscegenation, inhibitions on divorced
persons, etc. These are of course comparable to Israel's Cyprus marriages. Cf. the case
in which a Jewish domiciliary of Virginia had married his niece on a trip to Poland.
The issue was whether it was proper to grant her a non-quota immigrant's visa on the
strength of that marriage. On the assumption that the trip was not undertaken for
the purpose of evading the Virginia incest law, the Attorney General held the visa
grantable but observed:
It seems rather an extraordinary situation that a citizen of the United
States who could not lawfully contract a marriage with his niece at any
place within the United States except possibly Rhode Island, may go
abroad and marry his niece and gain her admission as a non-quota immigrant. The laws relating to marriage and prohibiting the marriage
relation between persons closely related go way beyond the matter of
religious beliefs. They involve the social welfare of the Nation and are
founded on considerations of physiology and eugenics.
37 Ops. Att'y Gen. 102 (1933), at 111; cf. Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41
N.E.2d 801 (1942). But see In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953)
in which the spouses, both Jewish, had gone to Rhode Island for the sole purpose of
contracting such an uncle-niece marriage and returned within two weeks to their
New York domicile. Thirty-two years later, the wife died and a daughter contested
her father's right to letters of administration. The Court of Appeals declared the
marriage valid and the surviving husband entitled to letters of administration. The
cases, on the other hand, holding that a marital status validly acquired at a domicile may
be disregarded by the new domicile are rare. Most of them emphasize the criminal offense
committed by continued cohabitation at the new domicile. The best known of these is
United States v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1901), and it illustrates the harshness
of the rule: again, a Jewish uncle-niece marriage was involved. The couple had married
while (apparently) domiciled in Russia. Following their immigration to the United
States, the couple and an "idiot son" were domiciled in Pennsylvania; the husband
became a citizen. His wife and child were ordered deported as undesirable aliens. They
claimed citizenship by virtue of the marriage in Russia. The district court declared them
deportable on the ground that the criminal statutes of Pennsylvania forbad sexual
intercourse between uncle and niece, and hence the marriage could not be recognized.
For collections of the American cases, see 117 A.L.R. 186 (1938); 127 A.L.R. 437 (1940);
3 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1949).
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in any case, has foundered? What of happy marriages, what about the children,
what of succession? Is there perhaps a public policy embodied in the very
existence of civil courts that explains and justifies their unwillingness to accept
the principle of retroactive destruction of status validly acquired under another
personal law? In any event, it seems very dubious that his austere approach
will be adopted by the courts without a clear, legislative fiat. It may be further
doubted that the Knesset will issue it. By contrast, Professor Levontin seems
on more solid, ground in attacking the migratory marriages of Israelis: these
openly defy a policy adopted by the law of their domicile and he presents a
strong case for non-recognition.
Whatever the merits of this spirited attack on the Skornik doctrine, it is
bound to provoke judicial reaction. One might surmise that the Israeli Supreme
Court decided the Skornik case as it did because it felt constrained to do so by
"settled" doctrines of "vested rights," or the "lex loci" or by rules of statutory
construction. If that be true, Professor Levontin has, at the very least, shown
that these rules are neither so compelling nor so unambiguous as to relieve the
Court from a responsible choice. If, on the other hand, the Skornik holding
was a conscious judicial effort to mitigate the harshness of some of the religious
rules, the attack will require the Court to re-articulate the premises of the
doctrine. There, for the moment, the matter rests.
VI.
This brief survey of the background and present functioning of Israel's
substantive and jurisdictional scheme for marriages and divorces suggests,
beyond the obvious implications of the situation, the question of the permanence of this scheme. Any answer that may be ventured should differentiate
between short and long term prospects.
Perhaps in the not too distant future, Israeli law may, at long last, make
available civil marriage 2 4 and even civil divorce legislation 23 for those Israelis
who have never been affiliated with any of the eleven recognized communities.
This step would alleviate an undeniable hardship without impairing the claims
of any of the communities upon its adherents. On the other hand, the plural
character of Israel's society would seem to require, for the foreseeable future,
the retention of at least concurrent religious jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce.
However, it is unlikely, so far as the Jewish majority is concerned, that
24. The only civil marriage permitted under Palestine and Israeli law are consular
marriages by virtue of art. 67 of the Order in Council and Rules 3 and 4(b) of the
Personal Status (Consular) Powers Regulations, 1922. A foreign consul properly authorized
by his government to do so may celebrate marriages where at least one of the parties is
a national of the consul's country. See Vitta 241-42. Section 2 of the Rabbinical Courts
Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law abolished this authority for resident Jewish
foreigners.
25. Article 64(i) of the Order in Council expressly declared the district courts
without jurisdiction to enter decrees dissolving marriages unless they were authorized
to do so by future legislation; no such legislation was enacted, Vitta 272.
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the present pattern of exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce will be
continued indefinitely 26 unless Jewish law is substantially reformed. There are
several grounds for hazarding this prediction. We may leave aside the larger
lesson of history implicit in the disappearance in the Western world, under the
ever-rising tide of secularism, of religious jurisdiction and influence from the
area. History is not an unerring guide. We may ignore the record of Ottoman
and Mandatory legislation-neither one distinguished by dynamism-which
unmistakably mirrors a trend of whittling down religious controls over matters
of personal status. The State of Israel need not follow in the steps of past
legislators. But it seems undeniable that the bastions of the status quo ante
are endangered by serious breaches. There is the steadily increasing independence of the Israeli woman which, in the long run, will prove irreconcilable with
her continuing subordination in the law of marriage and divorce. There is the
dynamic economic and social development of Israel which is creating a climate
of opinion that will not be hospitable to rigid orthodoxy; there will be, in particular, growing resistance to the archaic rules we have discussed and to the
claim of Jewish law to universality and to the resulting harsh destruction of a
marital status validly created abroad, a destruction which would seem to discourage immigration of those whose marital life was not previously guided by
the rules of orthodoxy. There is, finally, a growing body of legislation which,
step by step, endows these social and psychological developments with the
sanction of secular law.
The observer with a feeling for history may wonder why Jewish law is
entrenching itself behind the walls of the status quo ante instead of moving
forward into the future. The records of Jewish law abound with illustrations
of bold innovations. Marital law in particular, as we have seen, has never been
considered unalterable. 7 Perhaps those answerable for thought and action have
lost the sense of their historic responsibility, perhaps they have despaired of
being able to accommodate the demands of a secularized society without
abandoning altogether the basic tenets of Judaism, a dilemma that is serious.
In any event, no effort has been made even to search for a needed accommodation 28 The unique opportunity offered by the existence of the State of Israel
to reform Jewish marital law and thus to preserve its historic vitality has so
far been ignored. Whether it is irretrievable, as has been suggested, will
appear soon enough.
26. In drafting a family code for Israel, the Ministry of Justice carefully refrained
from dealing with the law of marriage and divorce, Israel Ministry of Justice, Draft
Family Code (Harvard Law School transl. 1956) at 40-41.
27. See, e.g., the urgent plea for reform in Palestine made on the eve of statehood,
Freinan, Sanctification and Marriage Customs and Laws (1945) (in Hebrew) at 397.
28. For a sampling of conflicting views, see symposium on "Jewish. Law and the
State of Israel" in Sura, Israeli-American Annual (1957-58) (in Hebrew), 457-518.
29. Cohn, A Problem of Yesterday, id., 474-91.

